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EVIDENCE - PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE -A.PPUCABILITY TO COMMUNI·
CATION BETWEEN STATE MENTAL HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRIST AND CRIMINAL IN-

TERNEE-Defendant was committed to a public mental hospital1 before standing trial on an indictment for robbery. One year later he was brought to
trial after being discharged from the hospital as mentally competent. His
only defense was insanity. The psychiatrist who had been appointed by the
court to examine the defendant testified in support of this defense. The
prosecution, in turn, introduced the testimony of the hospital psychiatrist

1

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. (1952) §4244, p. 2579.
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who had attended the defendant during his internment. This psychiatrist
was instructed by the trial court that communications between him and the
defendant were not privileged. Accordingly, he testified that the defendant
had told him that his insanity was feigned. It was the hospital psychiatrist's
belief that at the time of the hospital examinations the defendant was
competent to distinguish between right and wrong. Defendant was found
guilty and convicted. On appeal1 held, reversed, one judge dissenting. Information obtained by a psychiatrist of a public mental hospital while
attending an inmate comes within the provisions of the District of Columbia
privilege statute2 which makes such confidential information inadmissible
in evidence. Taylor v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 398.
The common law did not provide a privilege for communications between physician and patient.3 However, statutes enacted by thirty-one
states4 exclude such testimony and preserve the confidences between physician and patient in order to encourage the seeking of medical care.5 Although it can be argued that this privilege applies to psychiatrists simply
because they are physicians, 6 distinctions are made between the case where
the patient is examined only as to- his mental fitness 7 and the case where he
is treated for mental illness.8 In the former, the communications are not
privileged because the purpose of the usual doctor-patient relationship, the
seeking of treatment, is not present. Since the defendant in the principal
case was committed for treatment, the issue of the statute's applicability
relates to the broader question of whether the necessary relationship exists
'between a state hospital psychiatrist and a committed inmate.9 A psychia-

2 "In the courts of the District of Columbia no physician or surgeon shall be permitted, without the consent of the person afflicted, or of his legal representative, to disclose any information, confidential in its nature, which he shall have acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity and which was necessary to enable him to act
in that capacity..•." D.C. Code (1951) §14-308.
3 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §101 (1954).
4 For a recent compilation, see 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 384 (1952).
5 See Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E. (2d) 496 (1949); 8 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE,
3d ed., §2380a, p. 810 (1940).
6 See 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 384 (1952) for a discussion of the applicability of the privilege to psychiatrists absent a statutory privilege for doctors generally. Two states which
have no privilege for physicians have recently enacted one for clinical psychologists.
Ga. Code Ann. (1937; Supp. 1951) tit. 84, §84-3118; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §319.110.
'i See 107 A.L.R. 1491 (1937); Hopkins v. State, 212 Miss. 772, 55 S. (2d) 467 (1951).
s Casson v. Schoenfeld, 166 Wis. 401, 166 N.W. 23 (1918); Linscott v. Hughbanks,
140 Kan. 353, 37 P. (2d) 26 (1934).
9 In the principal case, the dissent believed that the rationale of the cases which hold
that no doctor-patient relationship exists when an accused person is examined by government doctors should apply, drawing a distinction between government officers and
private physicians, rather than between examination and treatment. Supporting this
view are Liske v. Liske, (Sup. Ct. 1912) 135 N.Y.S. 176 (hospital records required by
Mental Hygiene Law held admissible in annulment proceedings) and Scolavino v. State
of New York, 187 Misc. 253, 62 N.Y.S. (2d) 17 (1946), affd. 297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E. (2d)
174 (1947) (hospital records required by Mental Hygiene Law held admissible in action
against the state for negligence). For later New York cases to the contrary, see note 11
infra.
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trist must encourage the patient to divulge his innermost thoughts,10 and,
when a committed patient cooperates in this method of treatment in order
to further his recovery, his statements to the therapist should fall within the
protection of the statute. Accordingly, most courts have held that the privilege applies to communications between public hospital physicians and
committed patients.11 Under the privilege statutes not only must the information be disclosed in confidence to the psychiatrist in his professional
capacity, but it must also be related to the patient's treatment.12 Since any
statement a mental patient might make to his doctor could conceivably be
related to his treatment, and since hospital psychiatrists usually conduct
their consultations in their professional capacity,13 these requirements
ordinarily would be met. Nevertheless, in criminal insanity cases policy may
dictate that the privilege oe lifted in order to permit the better administration of justice.14 In several states the privilege of the statutes is limited to
civil actions15 or there are specific exemptions for certain criminal indictments.16 The statute in the principal case removes the privilege in homicide and criminal battery cases when required in the interest of public
justice.17 In assessing the value of the privilege as it applies to communications between a state hospital psychiatrist and a committed criminal patient,
several considerations must be taken into account. First, the preservation
of the privilege would tend to promote the early recovery of the criminally
insane by encouraging them to disclose freely their repressed thoughts.
Secondly, it may be argued that the state sets a trap for the patient by
committing him pending trial, only to use statements he made in confidence
to a hospital doctor to convict him when and if he can stand trial. On the
GUTIMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952).
v. State, 191 Misc. 688, 79 N.Y.S. (2d) 634 (1948); McGrath v. State,
200 Misc. 165, 104 N.Y.S. (2d) 882 (1950). See also Lumpkin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
75 Ohio App. 310, 62 N.E. (2d) 189 (1945), affd. 146 Ohio St. 25, 64 N.E. (2d) 63 (1945);
22 A.L.R. 1217 (1923). But see note 9 supra.
12 See, e.g., D.C. Code (1951) §14-308.
13 Exceptions will of c.ourse arise, as in Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392, 45 A.
(2d) 43 (1946), where a communication to the hospital psychiatrist was held not privileged
because he received it in his capacity as superintendent and not as physician.
14 For other situations where the privilege is denied for policy reasons, see 8 WmMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2385, p. 825 (1940); 45 A.L.R. 1357 (1926); 2 A.L.R. (2d) 647
(1948).
15 2 Idaho Code (1948) §9-203; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1949) tit. 93, §93-701-4; Ore.
Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 44, §44.040; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 28, §328; S.D. Code
(1939) tit. 36, §36.0101; Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 78, §78-24-8.
16 D.C. Code (1951) §14-308 (homicide or criminal battery); Wis. Stat. (1953) c. 325,
§325.21 (homicide). A few states make special provision for a criminal privilege. Ariz.
Code Ann. (1940) §23-103; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 15, §476; Minn. Stat. (1954) §595.02;
Miss. Code Ann. (1944; Supp. 1954) §1697; Wash. Rev. Code (1952) tit. 10, §10.52020.
17 D.C. Code (1951) §14-308. Application of the "public justice" criterion is a matter of discretion with the trial judge. Catoe v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 16.
Cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §8-53; ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rules 222, 223 (1942).
In the principal case, the dissenting opinion urges judicial extension of the statutory
exception to the situation presented.
10

11 Westphal
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other hand, retention of the privilege permits the accused to select as witnesses only those psychiatrists who will testify favorably and to silence
those who could expose a fabricated insanity defense.18 In light of the
severe criticism of the doctor-patient privilege generally,19 it may be time
for the legislatures to review the policy of the statutes, at least as they apply
to criminal inmates and state hospital psychiatrists.
Norman A. Zilber, S. Ed.

18 The problem of false insanity defenses could possibly be sol;ed by an improved
administration of the insanity tests given before the criminal is committed.
19 Chafee, "Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing
the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?" 52 YALE L. J. 607 (1943); McCORMICK, EVI·
DENCE, §108 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2380a (1940).

